French forces have left Chad after 65 years of almost continuous presence in the West African country. While the withdrawal was undertaken at Chad’s request, France’s foreign ministry maintains that this is “absolutely not the end” of military cooperation. The ministry also outlined its position on the crisis in eastern DRC, where Rwanda-backed M23 rebels are advancing in North and South Kivu provinces.
On Thursday, the French army handed over the Adij Kossei base—its last military compound in Chad—to Chadian authorities. President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno welcomed the “definitive and complete departure” of French forces. The handover marked the end of France’s military presence in its former colony, aligning with the wishes of Chad’s leadership in N’Djaména. President Déby, in power since 2021, had previously described cooperation agreements with France as “completely obsolete” in light of current political and geostrategic realities.
French forces have already withdrawn from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following military coups, signaling a decline in French influence in West Africa. However, Christophe Lemoine, spokesperson for France’s Foreign Ministry, insisted that the closure of the Kossei base was “the natural outcome” of discussions with Chad as part of France’s broader reconfiguration of its military presence in Africa. He emphasized that bilateral cooperation would continue in areas such as public development aid, economic initiatives, cultural exchanges, and student programs. On Friday, however, Déby took a slightly different stance, stating, “We are not breaking off our relationship with France, but we are ending the military dimension of this cooperation.”
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments on African nations’ failure to express gratitude for France’s military operations in the Sahel sparked criticism, including from Chad’s foreign minister, who called the remarks “humiliating and unacceptable.” Lemoine later clarified that Macron was referring specifically to France’s past military operations in Mali, particularly the Barkhane and Serval missions. France lost 58 soldiers in these operations, which were conducted at the request of Malian authorities. Lemoine stressed that Chad had not been part of these particular operations and should not be included in the critique.
Meanwhile, Chad held parliamentary elections in December 2024, with final results released on January 21, 2025. The well-established former ruling party, the Movement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), secured 124 of 188 seats. This election formally ended Chad’s four-year transition period following the death of former President Idriss Déby Itno in 2021. His son, Mahamat Déby Itno, who took power after his father’s death, has now gained electoral legitimacy and is positioned to remain in power for at least another five to ten years.
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Many analysts argue that Mahamat Déby’s transition was carefully orchestrated to ensure his continued rule. The parliamentary elections were not decided on polling day, as multiple measures had already been taken to minimize opposition success. The election’s integrity was compromised by the composition of electoral authorities, the lack of an up-to-date electoral register, suppression of dissent, and financial barriers for candidates.
The electoral authority ANGE (Agence Nationale de Gestion des Élections) and the constitutional court, both led by Déby’s appointees, oversaw the election process. Their historical loyalty to the Déby family raises doubts about their impartiality. Additionally, the electoral register had not been updated since August 2024, preventing many newly eligible voters—particularly young people, who tend to support the opposition—from participating.
Beyond electoral manipulation, the transitional government used violent suppression to weaken opposition forces. The 2022 protests against the extension of the transition period and Déby’s presidential candidacy were met with a deadly crackdown, resulting in hundreds of deaths. In February 2024, security forces killed Yaya Dillo, a cousin of Déby and a potential presidential rival. By May 2024, Déby had secured the presidency, and in December, he assumed the title of marshal—previously held only by his father.
The financial burden of participating in elections further restricted opposition candidates. Parliamentary candidates were required to pay 500,000 CFA (US$785), while provincial candidates paid 200,000 CFA (US$314)—a significant barrier in one of the world’s poorest nations.
The consolidation of Mahamat Déby’s rule could widen Chad’s social divide and heighten the risk of violent conflict. The country remains deeply fragmented along ethnic and religious lines, and the dissatisfaction that marked Idriss Déby’s rule is likely to persist under his son. Political-military movements regularly challenged the elder Déby, and the last such conflict led to his death. Similar tensions could resurface, threatening stability.
For France and Europe, Chad’s political trajectory presents both challenges and opportunities. The official end of military cooperation reduces France’s leverage in Chad but does not signify the complete breakdown of relations. Economic, cultural, and development partnerships remain in place, and France may seek alternative avenues to maintain influence. Meanwhile, the European Union could play a role in addressing governance concerns, promoting stability, and ensuring that Chad remains a key regional ally despite its internal struggles.
Ultimately, Chad’s future relations with France and Europe will depend on whether Mahamat Déby’s administration can maintain control without further alienating opposition forces or triggering new cycles of conflict. As regional dynamics shift and external actors reassess their engagement strategies, Chad’s leadership will face increasing scrutiny over its governance and human rights record, factors that will shape its long-term partnerships with France and Europe.
